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SUMMARY
Complex research and technology operations present many varied
potential hazards which must be addressed in a disciplined independent
safety review and approval process. The research and technology
effort at the Lewis Research Center is divided into programatic areas
of aeronautics, space and energy. Potential hazards vary from high
energy fuels to hydrocarbon fuels, high pressure systems to high
voltage systems, toxic chemicals to radioactive materials and high
speed rotating machinery to high powered lasers.
A Safety Permit System presently covers about 600 potentially
hazardous operations. The Safety Management Program described in
this paper is bciieved to be a major factor in maintaining an ex-
cellent safety record at the Lewis Research Center.
INTRODUCTION
A research center with many varied and complex research opera-
t?ins will zxperience potential hazards in the office, shop, laboratory
and research test facility. A safety program must be structured to
address all of these areas, with primary emphasis on people safety.
However, research facility and test equipment also require a sound'
safety approach to safeguard the accomplishment of the research
program mission. Over 30 years ago, the Center Management formed
the Lewis Safety Organization to address the safety and health needs
of the Center. The safety program was built on the premise that line
management is responsible for the safety of its operations and inde-
pendent safety review and approval would be required of all potentially
hazardous research operations. A formalized systems safety approach
was developed where the researcher formulizes a safety plan that is
implemented through the research program phases.
This paper describes a safety management program which has been
considered quite successful over the years in minimizing the high
attendant risks for conduct of research. Other research centers
have reviewed this program in the past and.have adopted certain aspects
to their respective operations. If this paper generates ideas and
assists others in the formulation of a research center safety manage-
ment program, then it has accomplished its primary goal.
Safety Officer.
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LEWIS RESEARCH CENTER,
COMPLEX RESEARCH $ TECHNOLOGY
In 1942, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics broke
ground adjacent to Cleveland Hopkins Airport for the third of its
Research Centers. The Center's small staff was given the responsi-
bility of conducting research on reciprocating and turbojet engines
and on rocket propulsion systems. In October 1958, NACA became the
nucleus of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The
Lewis Research Center (LeRC), today, is one of 11 Centers of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Figure 1). LeRC
now employs about 3,000 people and continues as a World leader in
advanced propulsion and power research and technology.
The Center's Charter, energy conversion research and technology
(Figure 2), is divided into the three main areas of aeronautics,
space and terrestrial applications. An example of the complex re-
search and technology in aeronautical propulsion can be seen in the
areas of internal aerodynamics, system interactions, materials and
components (Figure 3).
The test facilities at LeRC are located on.350 acres and repre-
sent a real property investment of 300 million dollars with an
estimated replacement cost of about one billion dollars. There are
over 100 buildings on the Center and S50 specialized research in-
stallations. An example of small and medium size research installations
is shown in the Engine Research Building which contains about 65 test
cells (Figure 4). Major test facility complexes include the Propulsion
Systems Lab 3$4 (Figure S), 10x10 foot and 8x6 foot Supersonic Wind
Tunnels, Space Environment Tanks, Icing Research Wind Tunnel, Rocket
Engine Test Facility and the High Pressure Turbine and Combustor
Facility. This varied research and technology complex presents many
potential hazards; for example, hydrocarbon fuels, cryogenic fuels
and oxidizers, high voltage, high pressure and high temperature con-
tainment vessels, hard vacuum systems, nigh speed rotating machinery,
radioactive and toxic materials and lasers.
SAFETY PROGRAM ORGANIZATION
Over 30 years ago, the Center recognized the need for a Safety
Organization which could effectively evaluate and address the many
varied potential hazards. The key elements of this organization,
which cover operations that are diverse and change frequently, are
shown in Figure 6. At the top of the list is management support for
the safety in day-to-day operations. Management must provide a visi-
bility into the operations of a research center wherein risk assessments
are balanced against the applied resources and performance objectives.
A major element of a safety organization is that it must provide
a consistent safety policy that applies to all aspects of the research
center operations. The systems safety approach is also a vital key
element where the research facility system must be reviewed and
analyzed through a discipline of systems safety techniques. Also,
the Safety Organization must be staffed with professional scientists -
?^'4:i
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engineers and technical support personnel with appropriate experience
and training to perform the safety review task. Another key element
is the independence of its members from direct in-line responsibilities
of the research operation subject to safety review. This independence
provides a fresh look, first-time visibility and provides for a safety
approval process separate from line organization responsibilities. A
final key element is a documented safety review-approval process for
each research operation with potential hazards. A formal system pro-
vides a communication medium to all concerned on the status of the
safety review and approval process.
The Lewis Safety Organization (LSO) is staffed with 160 personnel
of which 25% are full time and the remaining 751 are part time or col-
lateral-duty personnel. The full time staff, about 40 personnel, are
located in the Safey Of ice, Occupational Medicine, Office,of
Environmental Health and Plant Protection (left side of Figure 7).
Safety areas covered include industrial safety, medical services and
=	 industrial health, environmental health and emergency firefighting-
-	 personal injury  response. The collateral duty personnel, about 120,
provide staffing for the Executive Safety Board, Advisory Panels,
Accident Investigation Committees and Area Safety Committees (right
side of Figure 7). The primary function of the Executive Safety
Board is to serve as the Center safety policy and decision making
Board. The Board, staffed with Senior Management officials, estab-
lishes and maintains the system of safety committees, advisory panels
and investigating committees and acquaints the Director with any
significant major risks. The Environmental Pollution Control Board
is staffed and functions in the same manner, only it covers environ-
mental health and pollution concerns. The heart of the LSO is the
safety committee. The Center plot plan was divided into eight geo-
graphical areas with boundaries (Figure 8), such that each area
includes a complex of facilities with a degree of operational
similarity and manageable from a safety control standpoint. A safety
committee is assigned to each geographical area (1-8), to review
major process systems (Process Systems Safety Committee) and major
Center electrical systems (Electrical Systems Applications Safety
Committee). The safety committees are responsible for reviewing all
proposals for research o perations, facilities or equipment with
attendant potential hazards and approve/issue safety permits for
accepted proposals. The safety committees also submit to the
Executive Safety Board any significant risks or safety concerns.
A typical safety committee is staffed with six to eight employees
on a collateral duty basis. The committee chairman determines the
size and composition (mix of skills) that is appropriate for his com-
mittee's area of systems responsibility. Committee members aie chosen
with good technical credentials in such areas as experimental test
operations, research, test facilities and systems engineering. At
least one member should have a detailed knowledge of the committee's
geographical area of cognizance. However, the committee member's
immediate primary duties should, in general, not place him in a
conflict of interest situation with the safety committee activity.
This is very important in keeping the safety review and approval
independent from the research or project line management.
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SAFETY .REVIEW AND APPROVAL PROCESS
It is the responsibility of LeRC employees assigned to a system
or operation to insure that its design and operations are safe. The
personnel involved in the safety review and approval process repre-
sent either the requestor or the safety approval body. The requestor
could be the researcher, project or test operations engineer (Figure
9). The safety committee conducts the safety review and can obtain
advisement such as industrial safety and environmental health from
the Safety Office, Advisory Committees, Environmental Health and the
Lewis Safety Officer, as needed.
The phasing of the safety review process with the research test
program is very important (Figure 10). When research has decided to
undertake a new activity, the conceptual design agreed upon and the
facility site is selected, the responsible organizational element
(requestor) c.ntacts the Safety Committee Chairmen for a meeting. At
the initial meeting, the Yequestor describes the conceptual design,
siting considerations, o"Lline of operational hazards, etc. The
committee responds by indicating the nature and detail of documentation,
analysis, etc., it will require to accompany a formal request. The
safety committee may also advise the requestor to consult with the
safety, medical, environmental health or plant protection personnel.
for appropriate advisement. The key element is'early notificat'„n
and continuing communication with the safety committee through incre-
mental progress meetings.
The development of supporting documentation which constitutes an
overall safety plan is the responsibility of the requestor for a
safety permit. The documentation should be sufficient to permit the
safety committee to understand and assess the hazards that are in-
volved with the research operation, the safety standards applied and
the planned operational safeguards. In general, the amount or extent
of supporting documentation necessary depends on the complexity of
the experiment, the degree of risk and severity of failure.
One of the most important elements of a typical systems safety
plan (Figure 11), is the hazards identification analyses. There are
many types of hazards analysis which can be applied depending on the
type and degree of information available, complexity of system, program
phase, type of analysis desired and available resources. A brief
description of types of hazard analyses, data required and applicabi-
lity to program phase are provided in Figures 12 and 13. As noted,
each technique produces unique results and should be applied at the
appropriate time in the project phase. The depth and sophistication
of the systems safety plan will depend a great deal on the complexity
of the research system. Obviously, a simple bell jar type bench test
would not involve as much deta?.1 as a gas turbine engine test in a
major test facility.
SAFETY PERMIT SYSTEM
At the Lewis Research Center, a project engineer cannot operate
any potentially hazardous operation without a Safety Permit (SP).
r
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The Safety Permit (Figure 14), can only be issued by the Chairman
of a Safety Committee. In applying for a safety permit, the re-
t
uestor (project engineer) must fill out a Safety Permit Request
SPR) (Figure 1S and 1SA). These forms are designed to provide a
thumbnail sketch of the research test activity through a brief
listing of test conditions, hazardous materials, discharge products
to the environment, and applicable safety precautions. The SPR must
be signed by requesting Division Chief, which provides a visibility
to line management of the potential risks to be encountered.
An activity flow chart for the SPR (Figure 16) describes the
review-approval sequence for any new research test activity. Once
the Safety Permit is issued, the research test operation can commence.
The Safety Permit provides safety approval for a one-year period of
operation. The requestor is notified three months prior to expiration
that renewal is required if the research test program is expected to
continue. The renewal process follows the same activity sequence using
a renewal request farm, only the safety review consists of an on-site
visit between two safety committee members and the requestor.
An automatic data processing (ADP) system is used to log and
track the status of safety permits on a monthly basis. This system
notifies the requestor prior to safety permit expiration that renewal
must be initiated. If renewal is not requested prior to expiration,
the ADP system sends out a notice to cancel the safety permit and
remove the permit from the test cell posted location. There are, at
present, about 500 safety permits in force at the Center covering
many various large and small research test operations.
CENTER SAFETY OVERVIEW
An overview of research test operations is reported in the
monthly Facility Utilization Report (Figure 17). It provides a
snapshot of the operational status for all research test rigs and
facilities on the Center with a compilation of known hazards. If
pot,.;ntial hazards are summed at this particular time, they would
include 328 high voltage/high amperage operations, 89 hydrogen
operations, 18 activities employing 450 psi combustion air, 149
operations using natural gas, 144 with high speed rotation, 174
operations with hydrocarbons and 36 laser operations. Out of 1179
activities reported, 102 are designed for unattended operations.
If, at any point in time, a survey is required of research test
operations which exhibit a particular hazard such as hydrogen, a sort
for each safety area can be provided. The safety committee can then
review these particular operations to determine if corrective action
is necessary to meet a new standard, apply lessons-learned from a
previous test failure, etc. This report has become an excellent
operational tool since it provides visibility to management and the
Safety Organization of the potential hazards for research operations.
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM
The emergency response team at the Center is composed of the
Plant Protection staff, Medical Services staff and Emergency Reaction
Team personnel. The Plant Protection staff, consisting of two 11-man
firefighting units each on 24-hour shifts, provides first response to
fire and medical emergencies. The firefighters are also trained and
certified as Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT-A). They also provide
building fire inspections. industrial safety inspections, oil spill
containment, investigate .ehicle accidents and safety checks of faci-
lity and research systems. In the event of multiple emergencies or
when additional manpower is required, Emergency Reaction Team (ERT)
members are called. The ERT, whose members are usually technicians,
is composed of five S-man teams, an off-shift team of 1S members and a
special services team of S members. The Medical Services staff, com-
posed of a doctor and two nurses, provides occupational health and
emergency medical services during the regular work shift. The emer-
gency response team, in total, provides a very comprehensive, fast
and capable response to the entire Center.
CONCLUSION
In closing, the effectiveness of any safety program depends on
the support of management and employees and must address the basic
operational needs of the organization. The Lewis Research Center
has developed a Safety Organization and a structural systems safety
approach for addressing the high potential risks of research opera-
tions. Over the years, a safety permit control system has provided
visibility of risk to management and assurance that research test
operations do not commence until safety approval is granted. This
structural systems safety approach is believed to be a major contrib-
utor to the excellent Center safety record.
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KEY ELEMENTS OF THE CENTER ;AFETY PROGRAM
• Management support and visibility
• Centerwide safety policy and organization
• Systems safety approach
• Review performed by professional ,cienti,ts, engineers and
safety-health specialists independent in-line responsibilities
• A documented review-approval systerr. for each research operation
with potential hazards
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